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Abstract – Sensor Networks technologies had proved their 
great practicability in the real world, being just a matter 
of time until this kind of networks will be standardized 
and used in the field. We focus on security issues in 
Distributed Sensor Networks like useful cryptosystems, 
attacks, preventing and detecting possible attacks, 
describing state of the art in domain and proposing new 
methods for further investigation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless sensor networks are one of the most 
important and in development technologies of the 21 
century, being early researched for military purposes in 
1980s, 1990s. Recent growth of technology (increased 
computational power, smaller chips, microprocessors with 
less power consumption) opened a new world for research 
in this domain. Also, more research groups are activating 
today: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) with two important projects: Distributed Sensor 
Networks (DSN) and Sensor Information Technology 
(SensIT) [1], Berkeley WEBS, Crossbow, etc.  
A sensor network is a network of small distributed 
devices that are using sensors for measurement 
(temperature, motion, pressure, sound) and for prediction 
(weather forecast, fire ignition, earthquakes, military 
attack, building safety). These small devices are called 
motes and are composed of board, sensors, radio 
transmitter/receptor and power supply (batteries in most 
cases), some of them being equipped with a small 
processor for data processing and memory for storage. The 
motes are deployed in different kind of environments being 
able to self organize themselves in a hierarchical sensor 
network and produce the gathered information to the 
receiver. The main advantage is the small size of the motes 
(the size of a coin) combined with the small cost per piece 
and the capacity to self organize not depending of a 
previous setup and configuration. 
The main units of the mote’s architecture described in 
Fig.1 are: power supply unit, sensing unit, processing unit 
and radio transceiver unit. Power supply unit is composed 
mostly from disposable batteries or scavenging solar cells. 
The sensing unit receives the information from the 
environment through the sensors and then with the ADC 
(Analog to Digital Converter) transformed sensed 
information in a digital format to pass forward to the 
processing unit. The processing unit is the brain of the 
mote, being composed from a micro processor running on a 
real time operating system, memory and algorithms. 
Sensed information is analyzed and processed, possibly 
stored in the memory, and then according to established 
protocols, sent through the radio transmitter to neighbor 
motes. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mote’s architecture 
 
Because motes are running on batteries, the life of the 
motes and of the sensor network strictly depends of the 
energy saving design and implementation of 
communication protocols. Minimizing as low as possible 
the used resources, raise the problem of security efficiency, 
the more energy savings the less security for the sensor 
network. Also, transmitting a bit from a mote to another 
consumes about the same power needed for executing 800-
1000 instructions [2]. So, due to these problems, depending 
of the domain of interest, amount of information 
transmitted through the network, degree of needed security, 
the design of sensor networks should compromise between 
power consumption and security, depending of specific 
requirements.  
 
II. NEED FOR SECURITY IN WIRELESS SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
 
The design of wireless sensor networks faces two very 
important problems nowadays: restrictive power 
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consumption and securing communication protocols. Even 
more protocols had been proposed by researchers, none can 
be used as a standard and none can guaranty a very good 
security.  
The motes being deployed in a certain environment 
without any previous network setup should be able to 
communicate secure and be able to avoid intruders. For this 
reason cryptographic algorithms should be helpful, but 
unfortunately not enough for the moment. The sensor 
network designer should decide on more security implying 
high power consumption and less security with low power 
consumption. For example, in wireless sensor networks 
used for detection (fire, flood, object movement, etc.) the 
information validity should be no more than few seconds, 
enough to be propagated to the sink (the sink of a wireless 
sensor network is a device that reports gathered 
information to monitoring groups or fire an alarm). In this 
situation, on one hand, the level of information security is 
not very high, and could be used symmetric cryptographic 
algorithms or asymmetric algorithms with shorter key 
length, but on the other hand, authentication should be very 
important in order to minimize the possibility an attacker to 
send wrong information. 
Depending on the importance of the transmitted 
information through the motes, the transmission splits into: 
reliable and unreliable [3]. Unreliable transmission doesn’t 
care if the information sent to the next mote arrives 
unaltered or not, because the information was not relevant 
for the scope of the sensor network (i.e. in a sensor network 
detecting fire ignition, information “no fire” won’t be 
important because is the default status of the network). On 
the other hand, important information that change the status 
of the sensor network and that could cause an alarm should 
be very careful secured. Also, the network should be able 
to recognize intruders and not use their information. 
 The need for securing communication protocols is 
evident because we can obtain novel solutions for sensor 
networks self organization and aggregation, but without a 
high level of security, this kind of networks could not exist 
and no one would risk money on an easy to break 
technology. 
 
III SECURING PROTOCOLS AND ATTACKS FOR 
SENSOR NETWORKS  
 
There are two types of motes architecture: for general 
use and for dedicated use. The general use motes are meant 
to be reprogrammed every time is needed (to be used in 
another sensor network for example). This type of 
architecture is the nowadays tendency, but leave a wide 
door opened for attacks. Why? Because being 
reprogrammable, once an attacker captures one of these 
motes, will be able to read protocols, keys, and everything, 
and also will be able to write new software for malicious 
purposes. On the other hand, the architecture of the 
dedicated motes is more robust and also more expensive, 
the protocols and secret keys are all secured in the 
embedded system (mote), without any possibility for 
further software reading & rewriting and in case of 
detecting one of these actions the mote will autodestruct 
(tamper proof hardware)[4]. In the case of general use 
motes, once a mote has been captured, the sensor network 
won’t be able by any means to discover the mote is used or 
not for listening or worse for spoofing. For this reason 
depending of the deploying environment, should be taken 
an important decision if using rewritable motes or not. 
In [4], it is demonstrated how the EEPROM, program 
Flash and the SDRAM of a captured mote could be read in 
less than 1 minute and the security key extracted easily 
from the SDRAM. Due to this observation, if an attacker 
could read the mote’s hardware is just a matter of time until 
will find the security key, so we cannot say our data is 
secured as long as a mote could be captured and read 
information. The possibility of capturing will never 
disappear, so the only chance to secure data is to avoid 
extracting it from the mote, or at least try to postpone the 
time needed by an attacker to find the security keys. Some 
work was done in this direction [5][6], proposing an 
architecture where the motes are deployed with 
predistributed keys, and later erase those keys and replace 
with others, and so on. 
Security Protocols for Sensor Networks (SPINS), has 
two secure blocks: SNEP and µTesla. SNEP provides: data 
confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data 
freshness; µTesla is a protocol witch provides authenticated 
broadcast. Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) 
provides more advantages like semantic security 
(asymmetric cryptographic algorithms), data authentication 
and freshness with only 8 bytes added to the message [7]. 
For authentication the protocol uses a shared counter 
between sender and receiver (this way there is no need to 
transmit this peace of information with the message, the 
counter being incremented with each message) and a MAC 
(message authentication code). µTesla broadcast protocol it 
is based also on asymmetric method, with the novel idea of 
obtaining asymmetry through delaying the disclosure of 
symmetric keys. To send an authenticated packet the base 
station computes the MAC of the packet with a key secret 
key at the moment and than sends the packet to the mote. 
After the mote receive the packet, it can verify if the 
secrete key was not disclosed yet, meaning the packet is 
secured and can be stored in the buffer. At the time the 
base station publishes the secret key, the MAC of the 
message stored in the mote’s buffer is computed and 
verified for authenticity [7]. 
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol 
(AODV) and Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR), 
being under research by IETF (Internet Engineering Task 
Force) for standardization, are good for network traffic but 
not secured enough (see Table 1) [10]. 
 
Attack DSR AODV 
spoofing yes yes 
modification of sequence 
numbers 
no yes 
modification of hop counts no yes 
modification of source routes yes no 
tunneling yes yes 
 
Table 1. Attacks on DSR and AODV protocols 
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TinySec is a communication protocol developed by 
UC Berkeley research team, is addressed to sensor 
networks architecture with extreme resource constraints. It 
uses semantic secure encryption and supports two options: 
authenticated encryption (TinySec-AE) and authentication 
only (TinySec-Auth) [11]. But neither this protocol is 
secure enough, being weak on bogus routing information, 
selecting forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes, and 
Hello floods [12]. 
The communication protocols security for sensor 
networks should be obtain by combining asymmetric and 
symmetric cryptography with novel design of protocols.   
The simple use of symmetric or asymmetric cryptography 
is not enough nowadays. Symmetric key cryptography 
(Rijandel, RC6, Serpent,..) is fast, but the attacker can 
forge the secret key quite easy by capturing one of the 
motes and then using a laptop computer for debugging or 
brute force attack. On the other hand, asymmetric 
cryptography (RSA, ECC algorithms) offer a greater 
security, but is not fast enough for current needs of sensor 
networks. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), has proposed Rijandel symmetric 
algorithm to be the Advanced Encryption Standard(AES), 
also being the most indicated for 8-bit processors working 
on the mote technology today. Rijandel outruned TwoFish, 
RC6, Serpent and MARS, being much faster [13] and 
better to hardware implement on embedded systems (see 
Table).  
 
Symmetric 
cryptographic algorithm 
Clocks Normalized 
value 
MARS 34.163 0.28 
RC6 32.731 0.29 
RIJANDEL 9.464 1.00 
SERPENT 126.074 0.08 
TWOFISH 26.500 0.36 
 
Table 2. Comparison of symmetric cryptographic algorithms by 
NIST 
 
Asymmetric algorithms like RSA and ECC are used 
nowadays for securing systems with good computation 
power, unfortunately we can not say the same thing about 
sensor networks where computation power is reduced to 
minimum for energy saving. Even based on same 
principles (NP problems), ECC is much better than RSA 
for small devices like motes of sensor networks [14]. The 
key length of current RSA offered security is 1024 bits, 
while same security is offered by ECC at only 160 bits and 
in this environment, any bit being very important we can 
state that ECC is the way to go for energy savings (see 
Table 3). To have a solid security for sensor networks, 
except using tamper proof hardware, asymmetric algorithm 
must be used because they can offer authenticity and 
confidentiality.  
Sensor networks due to their restrictive constraints are 
vulnerable to a lot of attacks like: spoofing, selective 
forwarding, sinkhole attack, wormhole attack, Sybil attack, 
Hello flood attack. An attacker could be able to spoof, 
replay or alter the intercepted information and could create 
routing loops and generate false messages. Through 
selective forwarding an intruder can selectively drop 
certain packages, forwarding just a part of them. This 
attack could be transformed in a black hole attack if all 
packages are dropped. The most difficult to detect attack is 
the combination between sinkhole and wormhole attacks. 
Sinkhole attack tries to attract packages from neighbor 
motes with the scope of dropping them and pass forward 
the information received. In wormhole attack, two distant 
malicious nodes linked by a low latency band that is not 
recognized by the sensor network, are placed one near the 
base station and other near the target, creating a sinkhole 
and making nodes at a distance from each other to believe 
they are close. This attack is very powerful because the 
attacker doesn’t need to capture any node from the sensor 
network, just to deploy two malicious nodes, one near the 
sink and one near the target. Two schemes were proposed 
for detecting this kind of attacks but no one proved feasible 
enough [15]. The Sybil attack [16], a malicious node 
gathers identities of several nodes in the scope of changing 
its own identity with the identity of that group of nodes. 
These identities are later used to break cryptosystems with 
shared secret keys between multiple nodes. The Hello flood 
attack sends a lot of “Hello” messages to as many nodes as 
possible with the scope of shortening battery power. 
 
Asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithm 
Signature Key Exchange 
Sign Verify Client Server 
RSA-1024 304 11.9 15.4 304 
ECC-160 22.82 45.09 22.3 22.3 
RSA-2048 2302.7 53.7 57.2 2302.7 
ECC-224 61.54 121.98 60.4 60.4 
 
Table 3. Energy cost in mJ of RSA and ECC algorithms 
 
 
IV. DETECTING ATTACKS IN SENSOR NETWORKS 
 
Detecting anomalies and intruders in sensor networks 
is very important.  After detection, the sensor network can 
take decisions to investigate, find and remove malicious 
nodes if possible. Attacks that only listen to messages are 
not a big problems for a certain type of sensor networks 
(detection, alarm reporting) because of the message short 
time of validity. No attacker can use information like: fire 
ignition signal, leaking of chemical liquids, traffic 
problems, building problems, environment monitoring, etc., 
except for knowing before somebody else finds out or 
before it is made public (in most cases not being 
confidential). The most important security problems of 
sensor networks are spoofing (attacker masquerades as a 
node in the network, falsifies received messages and sends 
forward falsified message) and denial of services (DOS).  
In the literature there are few proposals about avoiding 
DOS attacks, an interesting point of view is that neighbor 
nodes to a jammed area should collaborate and make a 
border around it and route packages in network according 
to this border [17]. Detecting node capturing could be done 
easily by attaching a GPS receiver and in the moment the 
coordinates changes, the gathered information should be 
erased automatically and depend the network needs maybe 
the security keys too. Unfortunately GPS receivers are to 
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expensive to integrate intro sensor networks node, making 
the overall costs to be too high. 
A good way of detecting spoofing attack is the base 
station from time to time to send packages through the 
sensor network and after a certain time to verify if message 
was not altered (Fig. 2). The checking package sent by the 
base station/sink, will be propagated through the network. 
If there is a spoofing attacker within the network, the 
package will be forged and resent. After a certain period of 
time, the base station will be able to verify if it received 
any altered package and of course if the network is in 
danger for attacks. 
 
.  
Fig. 2. Detecting spoofing attack 
 
 
This kind of methods for detecting intruders are 
important to be researched and implemented because even 
if will have very good secured protocols (that doesn’t exist 
at the moment) it is always recommended to check from 
possible attacks from time to time. 
 
V. IMPROVMENTS 
 
Future work in security for sensor networks, can be 
done on: researching proper cryptographic algorithms 
according to desired security level, preventing and 
detecting attacks, novel communication protocol addressed 
to different kind of environments and security levels. The 
trend nowadays is to develop general self organizing sensor 
networks, witch leaves the possibility to rewrite software 
on the motes. For this reason it is hard to define security 
levels and the biggest problem is the possibility an attacker 
to capture a mote, read and then rewrite the software for 
malicious purposes. Tamper proof hardware is too 
expensive, but could be researched software technologies 
to erase information in case of attack or even to 
autodestruct themselves. Also Elliptic Curve Criptography 
(ECC) technologies could become a standard in security for 
restrictive systems like sensor networks, being the most 
promising asymmetric algorithm nowadays, unfortunately 
for the moment it doesn’t offer a small enough secret key 
length.  
 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Researching security for sensor networks should be at 
least as important as self organization, aggregation and 
communication protocols. Without security the sensor 
networks can not be trusted and won’t have practical 
implementation in real world. Researching symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, and also preventing 
and detecting possible attacks should be the next step. 
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